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Fragile Reasoning in Nassim Taleb’s Antifragile: An Enlightenment Transhumanist Critique

Posted: Sun, January 13, 2013 | By: Gennady Stolyarov II

Never before have I set out to read a book with such high expectations, only to encounter such severe disappointment. As an admirer of Nassim Taleb’s earlier books, Fooled by Randomness and The Black Swan, I expected to find insight and wisdom along similar lines in Antifragile. While Taleb’s latest book does contain some valid observations and a few intriguing general strategies for living, the overwhelming thrust of the book is one of bitter distaste for modernity (and, to a significant extent, technological progress), as well as an abundance of insults for anyone who would disagree with not just with Taleb’s ideas, but with his personal esthetic preferences. While sensible in the realms of finance and (mostly) economics, Taleb’s prescriptions in other fields venture outside of his realms of mastery and, if embraced, would result in a relapse of the barbarisms of premodernity. Perhaps as the outcome of his own phenomenal success, Taleb has become set in his ways and has transitioned from offering some controversial, revolutionary, and genuinely insightful ideas to constructing a static, intolerant, totalistic worldview that rejects deviations in any field of life – and the persons who so deviate. 

Nassim Taleb
Nassim Taleb

I am saddened to write this, but I am convinced that Nassim Taleb would find me to be personally repulsive. Not only am I a technology-embracing transhumanist ( a “neomaniac” per Taleb’s vocabulary), and a person who embraces the “nerdification” of society – but I am also an explicit representative and promoter of the legacies of the 18th-century Enlightenment – and a proud suit-and-tie wearer besides. Taleb seethes with contempt for the very trappings of modernity – even for modern formal wear – and repeatedly asserts that nothing valuable can be gleaned from those who wear neckties. As in many other areas, his conclusion-jumping pronouncements exclude the possibility of the world not fitting into his invented categories (with their associated normative spin). On the necktie question, he seems to rule out the very existence of persons like me, who wear neckties not out of any compulsion (my office dress code does not require them), but rather as an esthetic statement arising from sheer personal choice – including, not infrequently, on weekends.  

After reading Antifragile, and finding so much of the content in need of a thorough refutation, I have vacillated between writing a book review and a more comprehensive treatise. A short review, I realized, would not do this book justice – but I also did not wish to run the risk of writing a refutation as long as the book itself. The result is this – one of my longest book reviews to date, but written as concisely as the subject matter allows. Here, I seek to comment on many of Taleb’s areas of focus in Antifragile, highlighting both the book’s strengths and its egregious errors.   

Antifragile was one of the very few books I ever pre-ordered, as Taleb, until about a month ago, held a place among my most admired contemporary thinkers – along with such luminaries as Steven Pinker, Ray Kurzweil, Aubrey de Grey, Max More, and Ron Paul. Taleb’s writings on the fragility of the contemporary financial system were simply brilliant and highlighted the systemic weaknesses of a “house of cards” built upon highly sophisticated but over-optimized models that relied on the unrealistic stability of the status quo and the absence of extremely disruptive “black swan” events. I expected that Antifragile would discuss ways to survive and prosper in a black-swan-dominated world – a question that has been at the forefront of my mind since at least 2006, when I personally observed some “six-sigma” events on the stock market and – after reducing my losses to manageable levels – have refused to participate in that particular economy-wide casino since.  While Antifragile does provide skeletal discussions of some valuable approaches (such as the “barbell” strategy, on which I will comment more below), the majority of the book’s focus is negative: a harsh criticism of the institutions, ideas, and people whom Taleb considers insufficiently antifragile or “fragilizing”. One of Taleb’s favorite terms throughout the book is “fragilista” – used to describe financial modelers, politicians, and intellectuals of a rationalist frame of mind. The term – aside from creating vague and completely irrelevant associations with left-wing Nicaraguan terrorists – also poisons the metaphorical well with regard to the people and approaches criticized by Taleb. 

More generally, the book is pervaded by an undercurrent of anti-intellectualism, mocking those who use structured, explicit knowledge to interpret the world. This is rather odd, because Taleb himself is clearly an intellectual and a “nerd” of the sort he derides; his philosophical and historical allusions – and his expertise in mathematical finance (despite his criticisms thereof) – give away that fact. Fat Tony of Brooklyn, Taleb’s fictional representative of the non-intellectual person who relies on “empirical” heuristics and is able to become rich by occasionally betting against “suckers,” would not have kept the company of people like Taleb. No matter how much rhetorical contempt Taleb shows for those who engage in abstract reasoning, he cannot escape being one of them – and no amount of insults directed at his own kind will get him an iota of respect from those whose character traits he glorifies. 

An antifragile system or entity, per Taleb’s definition, is one that benefits from volatility instead of succumbing to it. Beyond mere robustness, which withstands volatility intact, antifragility is the derivation of advantage from volatility. The concept itself is an intriguing one, but Taleb makes a crucial error in assuming that most antifragility is normatively preferable. He does make an exception for “antifragility at others’ expense” – but only in a limited context. For instance, he is outraged at career intellectuals who do not have “skin in the game” and do not suffer for making wrong predictions or recommendations (more on this later) – but he explicitly praises the antifragility of biological evolution, a process that has resulted in the brutal deaths of most organisms and the extinction of about 99.9% of all species in history. Even within his premise that modernity contains “fragilizing” elements, Taleb presupposes that fragility is necessarily undesirable. Yet a beautiful vase is fragile – as is, for that matter, an individual organism. Fragility is no justification for dismissing or opposing an area of existence that has other intrinsic merits. Perhaps the proper response to certain kinds of fragility is extra care in the preservation of the fragile – as shown, for example, in the raising of children and small animals. 

When Taleb argues that post-Enlightenment civilization is fragile, he may be partly right – at least in the sense that such civilization requires the steady, conscious application of human intellect to maintain. Every generation must master the scientific, technological, and ethical accomplishments of the generations before it and amplify these accomplishments; this is the essence of progress. This mastery of civilization entails precisely the “nerdification” (i.e., sophisticated, refined, self-aware intellectualism) that Taleb scorns in favor of “empirical” heuristics that may have arisen out of premodern superstition in as great (or greater) a proportion as out of practical wisdom passed down throughout the ages. Steven Pinker, whose magnum opus The Better Angels of Our Nature I would glowingly recommend (and whose work Taleb has unfairly maligned, though Pinker’s response to Taleb is worth reading), illustrates convincingly that not only peacefulness but virtually every other characteristic of civilized human beings has improved dramatically over the past several centuries – and most remarkably over the past several decades. Nothing suggests that this improvement is an inexorable law of history, however; it is possible for anti-civilizing influences to take hold and for humanity to degenerate into the barbarism that characterized much of its past. In that sense, civilization may be considered fragile – but so eminently worth preserving and expanding, for it makes possible the good life for good individuals.

Unfortunately, Taleb has included himself among the influences that would undo many of the essential gains that humanity has achieved since the 18th-century Enlightenment. Taleb repeatedly references the “wisdom of the ancients” (the stoic Seneca is his favorite) and conflates the “natural” (a term from which he excludes human design and technology) with the desirable. Taleb praises the heuristics he sees in traditional religious systems (e.g., elaborate Greek Orthodox fasting rituals) while completely overlooking the massive horrors many traditional (i.e., premodern) religious systems perpetrated when persecuting dissenters, inspiring bloody wars of conquest, and establishing totalitarian regimes when combined with secular authority. The Enlightenment brought about a conscious questioning of religious (and all authority-based) traditions and commandments and resulted in the adoption of rigorous scientific inquiry in the pursuit of discovery and innovation. Taleb is wary of modern medicine because of possible “iatrogenic” effects (where the treatment itself causes most of the harm), and he even questions the genuineness and desirability of massive rises in life expectancy during the 20th and early 21st centuries. While there is some merit to balancing the anticipated benefits and possible side effects of medical treatments – and while Taleb may be right that certain fields may take treatment too far, especially as regards overprescription of psychotropic drugs to children – Taleb’s discussion of “iatrogenics” is mostly anecdotal and reliant on studies from much earlier periods in medicine (e.g., the death of George Washington in 1799 and a study on children in 1930).  The virtual eradication of smallpox, polio, tuberculosis, cholera, and the bubonic plague from the Western world by scientific medicine are utterly ignored by Taleb – as are the substantial declines in cancer death rates over the past 50 years, and the accomplishments of the Green Agricultural Revolution in averting the starvation of billions, which would have occurred if only “natural” agricultural techniques (i.e., techniques employed before some arbitrary historical cutoff date) had been utilized. 

There may be some merit to Taleb’s advice of avoiding medical treatment for minor conditions (where the iatrogenic effects of treatment allegedly predominate) and letting the body heal itself, while being willing to undertake radical treatments for extreme, life-threatening conditions. However, context in medical care matters too greatly to make sweeping generalizations. A fairly small skin lesion, which does not interfere with day-to-day functioning, may, after all, be the beginning of a deadly cancer, for which no self-healing mechanism exists. In medicine especially, the “empirical” heuristics championed by Taleb must give way to careful and systematic scientific study. After all, most premodern cultures relied on “traditional” heuristics for millennia, with disastrous results; such reliance can be called folk medicine. One only needs to consider the “traditional” Eastern “remedies” based on the superstition that one will become like the creature one eats – or “traditional” Western Medieval bleeding and surgical practices – to realize how much progress modern scientific medicine has actually made.   

  While a reader of Fooled by Randomness and The Black Swan might have inferred libertarian and individualist tendencies in Taleb’s writing, Antifragile, unfortunately, sets the record straight: Taleb opposes “too much” individual flourishing and freedom. He reserves his bitterest venom for transhumanism, which is the logical outcome of a libertarian society in which technological progress is given free rein. Taleb’s reverence for “nature” and “the ancients” trumps his skepticism of centralized regimentation – as his ideas on life extension and freedom of speech illustrate. He writes, “I felt some deep disgust – as would any ancient – at the efforts of ‘singularity’ thinkers (such as Ray Kurzweil) who believe in humans’ potential to live forever. Note that if I had to find the anti-me, the person with diametrically opposite ideas and lifestyle on the planet, it would be that Ray Kurzweil fellow. It is not just neomania. While I propose removing offensive elements from people’s diets (and lives), he works by adding, popping close to two hundred pills daily. Beyond that, these attempts at immortality leave me with deep moral revulsion.” Taleb says little of substance to support this “deep moral revulsion” – beyond repeating the same tired, hackneyed old arguments about “making room for others” by dying – as if the life of the individual had no inherent value and could be justifiably expended for an alleged greater good. Taleb does not address Kurzweil’s arguments about the exponential progress of computing and other technologies, and the logical extrapolation of such progress within the coming decades. In short, he says nothing about why he would consider Kurzweil to be mistaken, or what about Kurzweil’s lifestyle and ambitions he considers destructive. Taleb’s rudely expressed opposition to transhumanism seems to be primarily driven by emotional revulsion or, to be more charitable, a conflict of values. Additionally, Taleb does not seem to understand the movement that he criticizes. He assumes that extended longevity would be accompanied by extended frailty and senescence, whereas true radical life extension would only be possible if biological youth could be prolonged through periodic rejuvenation of the organism. Moreover, Taleb is, at heart, a collectivist who embraces the sacrifice of the individual to the tribe. He writes, “I am not here to live forever, as a sick animal. Recall that the antifragility of a system comes from the mortality of its components – and I am part of that larger population called humans. I am here to die a heroic death for the sake of the collective, to produce offspring (and prepare them for life and provide for them), or eventually, books – my information, that is, my genes, the antifragile in me, should be the ones seeking immortality, not me.”

The biggest disappointment I experienced when reading Antifragile was the realization I came to upon reading the above-quoted passage. This book was never about helping make the individual antifragile. The preservation of a human being in a volatile and uncertain world – and the attempt to equip a human being to flourish in the face of such volatility and uncertainty – were never Taleb’s key aims. Taleb’s views on antifragility are, indeed, not particularly helpful to me in my goal to discover strategies that would preserve, fortify, and enrich the individual in an often hostile, and, in many ways, fundamentally unpredictable world which lacks any manner of built-in justice outside of what humans, through their ingenuity and will, can implement. Taleb would have both of us (and everyone else) be sacrificed for the sake of an unspecified “collective” – as if some abstraction, be it “nature”, evolution, or “the whole”, has value in and of itself, apart from its constituent individuals. Yet it is precisely this sort of collectivism that enables inhuman atrocities, from mass executions of “the other” to suicide bombings for a “greater cause”. Taleb does not intend to advocate armed violence, but his rhetoric on heroism, “dying heroically”, and self-sacrifice eerily resembles the pronouncements of many a totalitarian regime, inquisitorial sect, or band of nationalistic or religious terrorists. The good life – the comfortable life of peace, productive work, and self-fulfillment – does not seem to be his objective. 

In several sections devoted to having “doxastic commitment” or “soul in the game”, Taleb glorifies the idea of leaving no way out in the event of one’s failure – forgetting that much true learning is iterative and often occurs through a trial-and-error process. If one is not allowed to recover from failure and change one’s approach (without crippling personal cost), then this learning will be preempted, and the individual will be destroyed instead. Taleb glorifies, for instance, the poet Almutanabbi, who died senselessly in the attempt to realize the ideals about which he wrote. But it is far more impressive to live in furtherance of one’s ideals than to die for them – particularly since living requires one to reevaluate one’s views in light of emerging evidence and continual reflection. 

Taleb is no more a friend of individual liberty than of technological progress. As a consequence of his view that intellectuals should have “skin in the game”, he insists that they should personally suffer the adverse consequences of their recommendations. Indeed, he would implement his scheme of penalties to the detriment of legal protections for freedom of speech. While criticizing the financial rating agencies’ misclassification of toxic assets as “AAA” securities, he remarks that “they benefit from the protection of free speech – the ‘First Amendment’ so ingrained in American habits. My humble proposal: one should say whatever he wants, but one’s portfolio needs to line up with it.” Elsewhere, Taleb proposes that individuals be held legally liable for the damage that their predictions and recommendations result in if followed by others. He ignores that not all individuals have the assets to even invest in a portfolio. Are the poor and middle class to be deprived of the ability to express their opinions or speculate about the economic future (even if such speculation is without much basis), simply because they do not have much “skin” to put into the “game”? Furthermore, establishing any legal liability for expression of opinion would have a chilling effect on legitimate and valuable ideas – since the very threat or prospect of a lawsuit may serve as a deterrent to publishing or even verbal expression in front of someone who disagrees. For someone so insistent on individual moral responsibility, Taleb ignores the responsibility of the recipient of ideas to actively judge and interpret them. Just as there exist sleazy marketers, so there exist peddlers of philosophical falsehoods, and sometimes those falsehoods result in personal gains for their advocates. Yet the responsibility of the sensible, rational individual is to filter out truth from falsehood using his own mind. No prohibition, no regime of penalties, no prior restraint can protect people from themselves. Such restrictions can only prevent people from cultivating the habits of autonomous thought which are the surest safeguards against charlatans and demagogues of every stripe. Taleb is too concerned about punishing the false prophets, and insufficiently concerned about elevating the general level of reasoning and discourse by means of positive persuasion, dissemination of true information, and technological innovation that alters people’s incentives and the balance of power. 

Taleb even departs from the libertarian advocacy of free trade and (genuine) globalization. While he acknowledges the theoretical validity of some specialization and the law of comparative advantage, he sees the global division of labor as vulnerable to volatility in the system. He argues that a change in conditions in one part of the world now has a far greater ability to adversely impact all other parts of the world – because the division of labor is so finely tuned. This is a fair argument for redundancy in economic systems – e.g., having “backup” institutions which could supply a good or service if the original supplier is unavailable due to an unexpected disruption. However, Taleb errs when assuming that businesses pursuing their rational self-interests under a truly free arrangement of global commerce would not already attempt to implement such redundancies. Supply-chain risk, for instance, is commonly discussed by representatives of multinational businesses and their insurers, who have a stake in preventing supply disruptions. Overreliance on any one economic partnership may indeed be imprudent – but does Taleb believe that businessmen with true “skin in the game” – billions of their own dollars – would be oblivious to the need for redundancy? Taleb makes no case for why free trade – in essence, the voluntary exchange of goods and services among individuals without regard for national origins or boundaries – would create a systemic lack of redundancy. A stronger argument could be made for how the current politicized environment of trade – a mixture of freedom and elaborate controls achieved by means of treaties and retaliatory protectionism – would produce insufficient redundancy and overdependence on those precious channels of international trade that remain permitted. But the solution to this problem would be more options – more channels for foreign trade – not fewer. Autarky certainly will not do, as it brings about its own massive vulnerabilities. One only need consider the consequences of a famine in a region which is not allowed to import food from abroad. Trade creates redundancy by allowing access to goods and services from all over the world, instead of just one minor segment thereof.  

  The nonlinear responses to volatility described in Antifragile are valid in principle. A system responds in a concave fashion if the harm to the system from a change in conditions is more than linear relative to that change (i.e., an accelerating harm). A system responds in a convex fashion if it is able to reap benefits from volatility in a more-than-linear accumulation. Taleb proposes that it is possible for certain systems to be concave or convex in both directions – being harmed by or benefiting from a shift in conditions either way. It is also possible for systems to be convex over some regions of inputs, and concave over others – e.g., a human immune system or a body engaging in exercise. Taleb does not, however, provide many tools to actually determine the inflection points within any particular system. Although he praises “empirical” heuristics for doing so – especially heuristics passed down through the ages – he provides absolutely no support to conclude that those heuristics do not overshoot the desirable levels of any given characteristics. To use the example he provides of religious fasting customs, even if one can be generous and suppose some benefit to the fasting (of which I am not altogether convinced), what evidence is there that the specific schedule and duration of fasts is optimal? Could not scientific investigation uncover a better way, and explain its workings in a rational, evidence-based manner, without recourse to superstition or ancestral hand-waving?  Furthermore, Taleb does not consider that the “wisdom of the ancients” may not have developed through the careful evolutionary process he describes – but rather comes to us as a warped reflection of some very recent generation’s interpretation of ancient practices – which themselves were altered by numerous political authorities, ideological movements, and idiosyncratic historical events in order to fulfill some very context-specific (and not necessarily virtuous or life-affirming) aim. To get a sense of how this has happened to distort prevailing conceptions of the past, one needs only to consider the early history of Christianity – where doctrine was often promoted or suppressed based on the temporal interest of Roman and Byzantine emperors and their officials – or the extensive revisionism performed by the 19th-century Romantics with regard to the Middle Ages. Taleb himself romanticizes antiquity (including the ancient Middle East), overlooking the incessant wars, disease, filth, vulgarity, persecution, and ideological totalism that characterized many pre-Enlightenment societies (e.g., the totalitarianism of Ancient Sparta or Calvin’s Geneva – which made even the USSR seem like a paragon of liberty and progress by comparison). 

Taleb’s contempt for wealth, and praise for attitudes that part with wealth lightly, betray the fact that he has never been in danger of losing his material comfort. Growing up in a prosperous , respected, and intellectual Lebanese family, Taleb moved to the United States and made a fortune as a trader, which he later magnified by selling his books. If he expresses contempt for the material well-being he sees around him, and a nostalgic longing for an idealized past, it is because he cannot truly envision what premodernity was actually like. Perhaps, because he greatly underrates the transformative effects of technological progress, Taleb’s image of premodernity is of a slightly rustic incarnation of our present world – except one in which people mostly avoid doctors and editors, walk on rocky landscapes in foot-shaped shoes, eat “paleo” diets, quote from Seneca’s dialogues, and occasionally engage in bloody contests over fine points of poetry, philosophy, and theology – just to show how much “skin in the game” they have with regard to their beliefs. Taleb neglects the possibility that only recently has life become remotely comfortable and quasi-meritocratic, while premodernity was a mostly uninterrupted stretch of miseries, cruelties, superstitions, prejudicial hatreds, and filth (punctuated by a few refined characters like Aristotle – whom Taleb maligns – and Seneca – people who were remarkable for their time and are remembered precisely because they stood out so far above their contemporaries). A small elite has always been super-wealthy (by the standards of their time) in every era and in every society, but it is an all-too-common mistake to imagine oneself in the position of a historical member of the elite (e.g., someone who would have read Seneca, or Seneca himself) rather than a common peasant or slave – which is the far more probable fate for a randomly chosen premodern person. The casual dismissal of wealth as not particularly important would not have been articulated by people toiling from sunrise to sunset in order to grow crops for their feudal overlords and be given a small fraction of the resulting harvest in order not to starve. Nor is this attitude particularly helpful to people who might have been interested in cultivating personal antifragility so as to prevent themselves from becoming poor.  

The most useful personal advice in Antifragile concerns the so-called “barbell strategy” for minimizing the downside of volatility while benefiting from the upside. The strategy involves putting most of one’s resources into an ultra-safe, ultra-conservative course of action, while devoting the rest to a diversified speculation, but in such a manner that the entire speculative amount can be lost without significant harm. An example of this approach would be keeping 90% of one’s money as cash or gold, and investing the remaining 10% into five different startup companies; each startup firm could fail – and many do – but it is also possible for a startup company to succeed tremendously and bring orders of magnitude of profit. If all the startup firms fail, then one has had a 10% loss – but this does not have to be ruinous if one is not hyper-leveraged. Taleb is also correct about the highly fragilizing effects of debt and recommends avoidance of indebtedness where possible. This is sound advice, greatly needed in a country where everything from everyday consumption to the purchase of big-ticket items to intangible “investments” such as formal education is often purchased on credit. Debt introduces fragility by amplifying the financial pain of volatility. A marginal drop in income could be endured by a debt-free person with savings, but would result in a leveraged person losing everything. Taleb’s advice here may not always be perfectly realizable – as not every person can afford to invest any percentage of his assets with the ability to continue living well if those assets were lost. Furthermore, mortgage debt is extremely difficult to avoid for a person without sizable initial wealth; other debt, however, is generally avoidable. 

While Antifragile has some virtues, Taleb should not have dismissed or derided his editors. If carefully confined to the realms of finance and economics, Antifragile might have been an illuminating and positive book on net. As matters stand, however, Taleb has managed to gratuitously insult practically everybody who might have been sympathetic to his previously articulated views – including the libertarians, transhumanists, and rationalist natural-law thinkers who would have found much to agree with in Fooled by Randomness and The Black Swan. Taleb even classifies Friedrich Hayek among the rationalists whom he dismisses: “We may be drawn to think that Friedrich Hayek would be in that antifragile, antirationalist category. […] But Hayek missed the notion of optionality as a substitute for the social planner. In a way, he believed in intelligence, but as a distributed or collective intelligence – not in optionality as a replacement for intelligence. […] Finally, John Gray, the contemporary political philosopher and essayist who stands against human hubris and has been fighting the prevailing ideas that the Enlightenment is a panacea – treating a certain category of thinkers as Enlightenment fundamentalists. […] Gray worked in an office next to Hayek and told me that Hayek was quite a dull fellow, lacking playfulness – hence optionality.” And there was the gratuitous insult again. Very well. We Enlightenment rationalists and technoprogressives will be happy to accept Hayek as one of us – along with Socrates, Aristotle, and Ayn Rand (for whose fan Taleb should not be mistaken, as he tells us in a footnote). Taleb can have Seneca, Almutanabbi, John Gray, and Fat Tony. We remain in good company without them. 


“as Taleb, until about a month ago, held a place among my most admired contemporary thinkers – along with such luminaries as Steven Pinker, Ray Kurzweil, Aubrey de Grey, Max More, and Ron Paul.”

You need to grow up, son. Ron Paul? Seriously? It made me sick to watch Paul, holding the gun of the state at his disposal, harass Ben Bernanke with Paul’s ignorant urban legends about economics, when Paul and his supporters wouldn’t tolerate that sort of statist bullying of the CEO of any other private organization. Good riddance to him.

I suspect that Paul’s wealthy backers, notably the Bilderberger Peter Thiel, supported his campaign to try to discredit and destroy the Federal Reserve System because they view the Fed as a crony capitalist deal which when to the “wrong” cronies instead of going to people like themselves. The Fed has lasted 100 years, despite all the ignorant propaganda against it, and I consider it unlikely that the Fed has reached the 95 percent mark of its total historical existence. As Taleb writes, something which has already lasted for a longish time will probably stick around for a lot longer, so perhaps the Fed displays this “antifragility” he speculates about.

By Mark Plus on Jan 13, 2013 at 7:20am

Great review, thank you.  I had been strongly tempted to buy Anti-fragile but now probably will not.  I was not as impressed with The Black Swan as many were.  It struck me as equally superficial and biased with Taleb frequently straying far beyond what he actually knew and expecting his “talking head” expertise to be sufficient.  The Pinker-Taleb debate is the first thing that anyone should read before diving into Taleb without warning.

By Mark Waser on Jan 13, 2013 at 10:44am

Hey, I am not a big fan of Enlightenment or “modernity” myself (see, but this does not prevent me from being a promethean transhumanist, a posthumanist and a technophiliac Faustian.

By Stefano Vaj on Jan 13, 2013 at 11:39am

I can see that this writer lacks the erudition to understand the complexity of the problem at hand.

By Phillip Crenshaw on Jan 13, 2013 at 3:34pm

I guess on second thought I would say two things. Firstly, please point out where NNT is wrong, math please. If not then this is just a rubbish attack and long winded at that. Secondly, Pinker’s statistics were rubbish how do you condone that?

By Phillip Crenshaw on Jan 13, 2013 at 8:31pm

more than once you took Taleb too literally and way from his own position

1) Hayek. Taleb admires Hayek. He said so numerous times. Saying that he has not got the full idea of antifragility is far from contempt. It is Taleb new idea and he says that while Hayek went close he did not said this veyr idea of Taleb. And the being boring is a point Taleb makes on another cognitive giant which he admires as well. It is an interesting observation (how great people can be boring) that is not in the derogatory dept.

2) Progress. Taleb values much of progress. But he disagrees when it gets glorified. and shows it many costs and risks.

Generally, you believe (I risk saying naively) that we can “do it right”.
Alas, in empirical reality governments etc. etc. usually do not do things perfectly right if not altogether wrong.
Thus, wagering the future on humankind ability to be error free, institutions to be rational, benevolent, etc. is hazardous

By Jazi ZIlber on Jan 14, 2013 at 1:25am

First, I want to thank Mark Waser and Stefano Vaj for their comments. Mr. Waser, I am honored by your good words – and I am an admirer of your writing on AI and existential risk; it is exactly the kind of sensible, clear-headed reasoning that is needed to make meaningful progress in these areas (and avoid apocalyptic sensationalism). Mr. Vaj, I will be reading your Interview on Biopolitics and Transhumanism and may have more thoughts to share once I have done this. The very fact that you are a transhumanist, however, will put you in the camp of people whom Taleb and his followers dislike. As for me, I welcome friends and allies from a multitude of philosophical backgrounds and will be interested in finding out more about your perspective. 

Mark Plus, while discussing Ron Paul in depth would be tangential to the focus of my article, I will say that I agree with Ron Paul’s views on the Federal Reserve and sound money. Centrally managed fiat money - the manipulation of whose supply is the root cause of inflation – poses a great danger to the wealth of individuals and the technological progress of Western societies. Centralized monetary policy is the redistribution of wealth from productive and innovative individuals toward politically connected special interests. If this redistribution is ended, then we will have more meritocratic outcomes, and technological progress would proceed more rapidly - since innovators would keep more of the resources they created.

Philip Crenshaw, my problem with Taleb’s arguments was never with his math (which is usually sensible - when confined to finance and economics), but rather with his philosophical pronouncements. To disagree with Taleb’s Luddite views on “Mother Nature” and not using any technology that is not “old enough” (as well as with his erroneous predictions about the future looking pretty much like the past) does not require a refutation of his mathematics. Indeed, the same concepts (fragility, robustness, antifragility, convexity, concavity, etc.) could have been used to an entirely different normative purpose than the focus of Taleb’s book. Taleb could have performed a great service by trying to teach *individuals* to be more antifragile, rather than advocating “dying nobly for the sake of the collective” and miscellaneous pseudo-heroic self-sacrifice. Moreover, Pinker’s statistics are not “rubbish”; they are meticulously researched and extensively commented on (including with regard to their limitations) in “The Better Angels of Our Nature”. You would do well to read that entire book before making such unwarranted pronouncements.

By Gennady Stolyarov II on Jan 14, 2013 at 8:19am

Jazi Zilber, you say that I take Taleb “too literally” - but I read the words on the pages of his book, and his tone in regard to the subjects I discuss is forceful indeed. If he means something other than the most direct interpretation of his statements, then it is his responsibility as an author to clarify this. I cannot look into his mind, and, at the very least, he is vulnerable to the allegation that he does not communicate his intent well. Regarding Hayek, Taleb expressed admiration for him in the past - it is true - but it seems to me that “Antifragile” represents a philosophical turn away from Taleb’s prior, more Hayekian works. Moreover, how is it not an insult to claim someone to be “boring”? I find that a truly erudite person would not find another erudite person boring, even if the two people have different styles and methods of presentation. Pointing out disagreements or errors is one thing - but Taleb gets personal way too often.

Regarding progress, I do not believe that human institutions are error-free (especially established institutions such as governments and large corporations). It is often the case (as has occurred time and again throughout history) that human progress involves taking two steps forward, one step back. But the key question is one of *which attitude* is the most conducive to achieving progress and fixing the errors that do exist. Is it an attitude of pessimistic skepticism about progress in general and default acceptance of everything from “Mother Nature” (with all of “her” cruelties and injustices) - or is it a concerted effort at rational, liberty-respecting, market-oriented, and technically sophisticated reform? I am not arguing for a top-down redesign of institutions. I support rational individuals and businesses acting within a libertarian framework to introduce innovations that become voluntarily accepted by others and that solve long-standing problems. Examples would include autonomous vehicles, new medical treatments, innovative web-based tools, distributed computing, game-based learning, digital currencies, political experiments (e.g., seasteading and electronic activism), private space flight, desktop 3D printing, genetic engineering, and nanotechnology. Even more important is the kind of individual attitude that embraces these innovations - exactly the attitude that Taleb derides as “neomania”.

By Gennady Stolyarov II on Jan 14, 2013 at 8:25am


Being very familiar with the multiple writings etc. of Taleb, I can affirm that there was no large U-turn in Taleb’s attitudes and opinions. Antifragile represents mostly opinions that were there before. There is new. But there no new person and new set of opinions.

I am very much convinced that the Hayek comments were much more admiring. He he also recounting that he got shocked hearing that Herbert Simon led a highly boring life. Does he value him less? not a bit. it is a personal comment rather than attack. In the context of Taleb’s style it is hardly an insult. We can agree to disagree on that.

I do not think that the value of attitude is decisive in analyzing the reality of progress. If progress has costs, then these costs has to be taken into account.

The critique of progress total beliefs is that progress is not guaranteed, and that it has costs. You must remember that communism, fascism etc. were all using the complete belief in progress as a cornerstone.

Progress is a dynamic like any other. with costs, benefits and failures. no less of course. But not more.

By Jazi ZIlber on Jan 14, 2013 at 9:40am

Jazi Zilber, the core of my disagreement with Taleb is not about whether progress has costs at all, but about the nature and extent of such costs. Taleb perceives the costs to be so great as to justify erring on the side of “Mother Nature” and rejecting any technology which has not “stood the test of time” in his view. Yet, by that thinking, the majority of humanity would never have embraced any innovation, because, for every device, there was a time when it was new and untried. The world needs precisely those pioneers and “neomaniacs” whom Taleb dismisses but who are essential in teaching the rest of us the best and safest ways to use new technologies. For me, while any particular technology may have associated risks and may require creative approaches to avoid those risks, the benefits greatly outweigh the costs in the case of any technology that emerges on the market. (Note that I exclude certain governmentally planned technologies, such as nuclear weapons from this statement.)

As a concise way to contrast my view with Taleb’s, Taleb seems to endorse the “precautionary principle” (reject the technology unless its safety can be proven beyond doubt), whereas I embrace Max More’s “proactionary principle” (be mindful of any risks of a technology, but also be mindful of the present harms arising from its non-existence – and be deliberate in your choice).

I agree that progress is not guaranteed and have stated this in my review. This is even more of an argument for why progress should be deliberately aimed for and embraced. This added motivation will help us achieve improvements that are contingent on future human action and that will benefit us personally. I also understand that the word “progress” has, at times, been hijacked by various totalitarian and authoritarian movements. However, its origins date back to the Enlightenment, whose thinkers were friends of liberty and were concerned with genuine, universalizable improvements of the human condition. This idea should not be opposed just because it was occasionally misinterpreted and exploited by fascists and communists. Rather, the fact that it was hijacked in this way is a testament to its power and ability to motivate.

By Gennady Stolyarov II on Jan 14, 2013 at 5:42pm

> fascism etc. were all using the complete belief in progress as a cornerstone

This would be violation of Godwin’s law, but it’s simply not true.

Althoudh Nazis did often mention “technologica progress” in their propaganda, they definitely wouldn’t even agree with the idea that any technological progress goes hand in hand with social one, not to mention any views that social progress means more equality, more education for everyone etc.

Clearly, fascism has nothing common with progressivism. Trying to build 3000 mm gauged railway is not the essence of progressive views.

As for communists, they did proclaim inevitability of social progress and desirability of technological one, but, again, they saw a bit different things as progressive than we do today. Still they could be called progressivists — certainly a different kind of progressivists than e. g. today’s transhumanists or hackers or pirates.

From this examples we see that the very notion of “progressive” is itself changing, and the sense of the progressive idea in the 21st century is to be ever-refining, not rejecting because some earlier in the 20th century some people misinterpreted what had been viewed even before in the 18th century as progressive, and turned out to be reactionary or stagnant. The question is, “What kind of progress do we seek”, not rhetorics like “You cannot tell me now what kind of progress you seek, so let’s better not seek any”.

As for Taleb, I suspected him before when he started putting the word “science” in quotes, but for a while thought he really has something valuable to add for “the science of reliability” he was supposed to promote. Instead he turned to be rejecting the core values of reason. Once seen as a discoverer of new fallacies (although they were in fact not new), he himself dived into naturalistic and almost any other fallacy possible. I suspected this from his earlier books, but didn’t expect so much attention from him to Kurzweil and h+, and not only in terms of achievability (I thought he would overlook it skeptically), but the very values of ours.

Now I suspect his aggressive reaction today is actually proving the fact he was wrong, his theory hit limits — not only in the world that is still improving its rationality, but also in his own head. I think when he wrote his first books, he knew nothing about h+ as a social movement (probably he read some sci-fi books about immortality but used to pay not more attention to this idea than to space and other fiction), the world itself was paying not so much attention to science and innovation as today (including the very idea that another big jump in STEM is what will lead us out of the economical crises), and he probably thought that the Enlightenment as an inspiring idea was dead. It turned out to be alive and well, today we talk about private space flights, and the startup boom, and DIY science and desktop manufacturing etc., and and he sees is his own ideas losing relevance. This “Antifragile” is his desperate attempt to stake his all by exposing his core nihilistic and hypocritical worldview. The post-crisis world is definitely going in other direction than he suggested, and his attempts to yell “hey the people, you are stupid, you should not go forward but turn back and die” don’t even make me sympathetic…

So thank you, Mr. Nassim Nicolas Taleb, for revealing finally who you really are: a self-proclaimed Don Quixote-style enemy of any people willing to live, to improve and to save other lives.


By VovixLDR on Jan 14, 2013 at 6:49pm

“However, its origins date back to the Enlightenment, whose thinkers were friends of liberty…”

That’s debatable. Most of its supporters believed in the superiority of the absolute rule of “enlightened princes” over traditional liberties and local self-determination and public opinion.

I am afraid that liberty, unless one interprets it as “freedom of trade” has more to do with the romantic, rather than with the enlightenment, worldview.

In turn the romantic view towards technology and more in general the quest for knowledge, self-overcoming and power is more apt to describe today’s opposition between fear and denial on one side, and a conscious prometheism on the other.

By Stefano Vaj on Jan 15, 2013 at 7:11am well as an abundance of insults for anyone who would disagree with not just with Taleb’s ideas, but with his personal esthetic preferences…

Yep.  I wanna laugh, that does seem to describe the good doctor.  He does have an intolerance & disdain for those with value differences from his chosen norm.

But I guess I have a certain amount of faith, in Taleb.  There is a degree of intellectual honesty and self-awareness ( I think ) required to produce Black Swan and Fooled By Randomness.  So my expectation is that, when Taleb has a chance to settle down, far from the maddening crowd and reflect during solitary moments, he will be able to step back and reconsider some of the tactics directed towards his critics.  Perhaps he will see how much easier & more gracious it would be to say, “Fred, you’re misunderstanding the point, re-read page 73 and 124, that will clear it up”, rather than outright accusations “YOOOOOUUU didn’t read the book, you merely skimmed over the critical reviews, you FRAAAAUUD!”. 

Taleb is probably right in some cases.  But any reader can be having a bad day, where their concentration & memory are low but they still force themselves to read anyway.  And genuine misunderstandings are always possible.

Anyway, it’s also possible that during the period close to the publication of a book, authors tend to be more defensive about their ideas, and under public pressure simply aren’t capable of dealing with disagreements objectively.

Genn, thanks for taking time to write up such a detailed critique.  Looking forward to reading the rest of it, this evening.





By DCWhatthe on Jan 29, 2013 at 2:22pm

I think you should relax a bit more and understand that much of Taleb’s rhetoric is hyperbolic in order to provoke a response from people who would generally ignore his ideas otherwise.  The whole suit and tie thing and derogatory nerd comments are not necessarily set in stone, it is an embellishment of the type of person who take themselves and their assumed knowledge too seriously, especially within finance and economic circles.  I would sooner trust my money with the jeans and turtleneck wearing Steve Jobs or Jeff Bezos than a wall street pundit wearing a bow tie—it is a silly heuristic, but it makes a vivid statement.

The anti-enlightenment sentiments are limited to the overconfidence of mathematical methods in domains of complex adaptive systems.  He acknowledges scientific and technological advances in simpler domains, and is grateful for them, but the idea that they can encompass all domains of natural phenomena with the ease that they showed in simpler domains really is a problem stemming from rigid enlightenment thinking.  Scientists call this physics envy, and rightfully so.  With respect to such complex domains, the heuristics of pre-enlightenment societies and religions really do offer a better strategy than blind faith in science if analyzed from the risk/reward relationship of payoff functions, not platonic attempts of figuring out absolute truth/falsity.  And iatrogenics is not just a historical anomaly, it is a modern problem, just look at the obesity epidemic, the fallacious lipid-heart hypothesis, the recommendations by the ADA, and the statistics for complications of unnecessary in-patient procedures and hospital born infections.

As for the naturalistic fallacy of survival of the fittest and libertarian ideology, he states numerous times how vile and uncaring evolution by natural selection is in nature.  He thinks societies should protect the disadvantaged, allow the risk takers to maximize their potential, and the middle will be taken care of as a result.  He does not want individuals to be subservient to the collective, but does take a mature and wise stance that no man is an island and societies need checks and balances such as provisions for not allowing people to profit without ‘skin in the game’ and decentralizing critical industries that pose systemic threats.  The Western notion of extreme individualism and laissez-faire libertarian ideology is destabilizing to society and never was a dominant philosophy until after the enlightenment.  I’d say, if anything, he is closest to being a libertarian socialist or left libertarian.

Lastly, his philosophy is not a romanticizing of brutal ancient societies just for the sake of aesthetics, but is an understanding of the necessity of hormesis for antifragility in complex adaptive systems.  This does not mean a return to those ancient ways, but an incorporation of the allowance for smaller, non-fatal failures to pervade the system as opposed to allowing a fragile system to scale up and later suffer systemic catastrophes.  This is the essence of ‘convexity’, and it guides his thoughts on technology and futurism.  I admit that he is too anti-transhumanist for my taste, I disagree with him about the repugnance of trying to stop death and disease entirely, and I think his rants against neomania are unwarranted, but again, they are hyperbolic rhetorical devices that serve his overall thesis.  Transhumanists should (and the thoughtful ones do) think not just about the potential benefits of technology, but the risks as well, and a positive singularity should be an antifragile one. 

By haig on Apr 05, 2013 at 6:54pm

This is an interesting review. Having listened to Taleb talk and having read his book, I know that certain statements are not to be taken literally. However, I have three points to raise.

I believe that every decision-maker should have their skin in the game. Regardless of the spread of information and the quantum leaps in its growth, we cannot be expert in every field. Therefore if I’m investing my money in something that the producer has stated is good, then it must be good. Else, he must be personally held responsible for it. An economy should not be run on the people’s nascent theories - things they hardly understand. If you make predictions that cost society you must be held responsible. In the recent financial crisis, the people who caused it got bailed out (antifragile at society’s expense) and they paid themselves bonuses. The victims went home licking their wounds. Some lost everything, including pensions of septuagenarians and octogenarians. I guess, if you are able transport yourself into those individuals, you would really appreciate the importance, the need actually for them to have their skin in the game and the need for them to fail in order to develop a robust, or even an antifragile, industry.

Two: on the issue of comparative advantage, you left out several variables that must be taken into account and which Taleb discussed. Imagine what will happen if a country that imports a larger part of it food needs wakes up tomorrow to find itself at war with this country. What would the likely effect be? Had Iran been importing its food needs from Europe and the US, it could not have continued with its stance on nuclear technology. Besides, the fact that you are good in A and excellent in B does not mean do not deal in B. There are second order effects.

Three: on the issue on neomania, I agree that technology is good. And I see nowhere in Antifragility that Nassem said it wasn’t. He states that if people are asked to predict the future, they would make it complex, but these things they would predict wouldn’t be there in the future. Today, we are fighting Mosanto seeds and agrochemicals. Can a country entirely depend on a profit-making company for its food needs? Or should a country do so? For most African countries, re-sowing seeds are the only way to preserve seeds; thus, the farmers work as seed banks. Now imagine a situation when all local seeds have been replaced with GM seeds which can not be re-sowed. Is this the kind of world you want to create. So whilst technological advancement is good, we must not think that it is the panacea or that technology’s trajectory is only towards good. Science has been used to advance several dangerous causes.

Thanks for the links to Pinker’s response. And again, I will add that some of the issues raised here are trivial.

By Nana Fredua-Agyeman on Apr 26, 2013 at 3:34am

>> If you make predictions that cost society you must be held responsible.

Actually, it should be “If you X that cost society you must be held responsible.”

And, “If you Y that saves society you must be rewarded.”

The system breaks when those who are given incentive to game the system are put in control of the system.

By Mark Waser on Apr 26, 2013 at 8:46am

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