Despite this apparent and hypothetical success, Transhumanism is still susceptible to failure on certain grounds; for instance, one has made several assumptions, such as a majority of citizens accepting augmentations in pursuit of civilization. This assumption is fundamentally flawed in its reasoning as, even with automated faculties, one must accept augmentation of one’s body for the sake of a civil economy; this is a similar infringement of autonomy as previous contracts, as the imposition of augmentation constitutes the imposition of a civil contract, which one may disagree with. To ensure agreeable terms, declination of augmentations must be a viable option; as it is not, said terms risk devolution into a conventional contract, with other uncivil terms exacerbating issues further. Hence, the imposition of augmentations becomes critically contentious and an obvious source of uncivilization.
Furthermore, one has assumed that the social contract and its leadership will enact and enforce terms that promote civilization through an innovation theory of labour, by innovating augmentations that adapt one’s faculties to requirements of the social contract, an imposition made potentially civil through automated augmentations. However, autonomy augmentations are intended to enhance human autonomy, and not infringe on such autonomy. This does not prevent uncivil intent arising in an autonomous citizenry and may even increase the risk thereof; such uncivil intent then goes on to contravene a civil Transhumanist contract, abandoning civil terms and the implicit innovation theory of labour, thus uncilivizing society. As Transhumanism has no way of simultaneously preserving autonomy and its civil contract without inducing uncivilization, it fails to guarantee civilization.
Though obviously uncivil, autonomy alterations of a direr nature lead to a unique dilemma whereby, despite infringement of autonomy, a civil economy can be established without disagreement. Irrefutably uncivil, such alterations would automate, or even remove, autonomy to the point where any social contract is acceptable and agreeable to altered citizens; moreover, these augmentations and alterations are opposed to Transhumanism, as they violate its basic principles, and are closer to Posthumanist theory. These alterations raise an interesting point, however, as given that augmented or altered organic labour is considered synthetic, autonomy hijacked in this way amounts to automated synthetic labour, which already exists and can be developed further. Indeed, subjugated and augmented citizens are in fact less useful and more expensive than conventional automated synthetic labour given the cost of augmentation and maintenance of said citizens, at least in labour where autonomy is unnecessary.
To this end, one concludes the obvious; that autonomy is superfluous to labour that does not require autonomy. Subjugating autonomy in an attempt to sustain an economy and retain a false kind of “civilization” not only misses the point of civilizing society but fails to recognize the same fundamental issue as Transhumanism does; that reconciliation of economy and citizenry requires consideration of the nature of labour and labourer, and civil arrangement thereof. As such, one introduces sentient and insentient labour, with the former requiring autonomous labourers to be performed and the latter not. These definitions now express the nature of labour with regards nature of the labourer; sentient labourers are thus fundamentally incompatible with insentient labour, and vice versa. As Transhumanism, and all conventional contracts, fail to consider this in their social contracts, their principles and terms are inherently flawed, lacking simultaneous preservation of autonomy and economy and so failing to guarantee civilization.