While this text mainly examines Transhumanism, it has made more than a passing reference to Posthumanism; to provide better context, despite the retrospection, one now intends to elaborate on the nature of Posthumanism. Posthumanist ideology does share similarities with Transhumanist ideals, though in this text it is defined as being distinct from Transhumanism, with the former going beyond what it is to be human, and the latter not. Indeed, whereas a Transhumanist contract would need to ensure that augmentations allow citizens to experience an enhanced humanity, in form and function, a Posthumanist contract has no such terms, allowing one to depart from their humanity entirely.

There is clearly an overlap between the two, as given enough development and license, Transhumanism may result in augmentations allowing one inhuman experiences; however, the caveat principle of preserving human experience restrains Transhumanist contracts from implementing them. Given the similarities, Posthumanist contracts face a similar challenge in civilizing society, as they must also ensure civilization through augmentation of human faculties; given the differences, however, Posthumanism is unrestricted and may introduce terms that allow for the complete restructuring of one’s faculties.

The most critical faculty one may consider modifying to a Posthumanist degree is one’s autonomy, as removing, restructuring or expanding one’s autonomy beyond humanity changes one’s intent; through this modification one can ensure full submission and/or agreement to the social contract by automating it, partially or wholly. While previously this has been seen as a means of economic gain, one now considers whether this is autonomy at all, and whether one truly needs autonomy to fulfil satisfaction; in the case of the former, it depends to what degree one automates one’s autonomy, and in the case of the latter, a definitive no. Where one elects to automate one’s autonomous faculties completely, one forgoes autonomy entirely and finds that one’s existence is reduced to a series of experiences, each ensuring one’s satisfaction as much as one’s automated autonomy could achieve.

This is all assuming that the conditions for one’s satisfactions hold; a truly civil contract would suffice for this, a contract containing terms where civilization is guaranteed. However, as one lacks autonomy in such a case, such automation is not truly agreement and so such a contract could not be considered truly civil. However, these predicaments affect only Posthumanist contracts, and this section is only intended to define the differences between Posthumanism and Transhumanism. Indeed, a Posthumanist society is so far beyond the capacity of current societies, it is beyond speculative, and even irrelevant, to attempt to envisage such a society.